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The Advocate's Conflicting Obligations Vis-$-Vis 
Adverse Medical Evidence in Social Security 
Proceedings 
Robert E. Rains* 
The conscientious attorney representing claimants for 
disability benefits before the Social Security Administration 
(SSA)' is constantly beset by ethical problems unique to that 
clientele in  situations for which there is conflicting guidance 
under either the Code of Professional Responsibility or the 
Rules of Professional Conduct. Additionally, the nature of the 
clientel-people who are, or believe they are, either mentally 
or physically disabled--creates a set of problems of its own. 
Frequently the attorney must deal with a client who believes 
that she is disabled by physical impairments, but the attorney 
quickly concludes that the primary impairments are mental. 
This type of client is often the most resistant to well-meaning 
legal advice. Often the attorney must try to assist a client who 
suffers from diminished or impaired intellect to make 
intelligent decisions regarding complex litigation strategy. 
The adjudicatory system within the Social Security 
Administration could best be described as con~oluted.~ The 
underlying law has been aptly described by the United States 
Supreme Court as "Byzantine773 and "almost unint elligible."l 
* Professor of Law and Director, Disability Law Clinic, The Dickinson 
School of Law; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1974. The author wishes to thank 
Professor Linda Fisher for her assistance in providing material and insights 
regarding the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rules of Professional 
Conduct. I am also indebted to several private practitioners for their insightful 
reviews; you know who you are. Opinions contained herein are those of the author. 
O Copyright 1994, Robert E. Rains. All rights reserved. 
1. The statutory authority for such administrative proceedings to determine 
disability is found at 42 U.S.C. § 405(b). 
2. See generally 20 C.F.R. 404.900-404.996, 416.1400-416.1494 (1994). 
3. Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 43 (1981). 
4. Id. (quoting Friedman v. Berger, 547 F.2d 724, 727 n.7 (2d Cir. 1976), 
cert. denied, 430 U.S. 984 (1977)). 
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For example, the ancillary law on obtaining adequate legal 
fees, either from the client or from the government, is itself 
hideously complex, involving different rules depending upon 
the specific program involved, constantly changing procedures, 
state and federal agencies, and sometimes federal courts.5 
Complicating the regulatory and statutory framework for 
obtaining fees is an overlay of recent Supreme Court decisions 
which are difficult to analyze, if not positively contradictory to 
each other? 
Perhaps the most intractable problem facing the 
practitioner, however, is that of dealing with medical records or 
reports which appear to undercut the client's claim of 
disability. While the conflict that exists among competing 
duties of zealous or diligent representation7, client 
confidentiality8, and candor towards the tribunals is obvious, 
an appropriate resolution has been elusive. The problem has 
been further exacerbated by disputes regarding the ability of 
individual administrative law judges, or the Offices of Hearings 
and Appeals, to promulgate their own rules and regulations of 
procedure,1° and by the increasing concern of attorneys 
working in this area about competition from non-attorney 
representatives who may not be bound by the Code or the 
Rules." Additionally, there is a lack of uniformity among the 
few state and local bars which have addressed this issue in 
5. The primary statutory bases in Title I1 actions are 42 U.S.C. 8 406 (1988) 
and 28 U.S.C. 8 2412 (1989). The law governing Title XVI cases is murky and 
incomplete. See Bowen v. Galbreath, 485 U.S. 74 (1988). 
6. See, e.g., Shalala v. Schaefer, 113 S. Ct. 2625 (1993); Melkonyan v. 
Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89 (1991); Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617 (1990); Sullivan 
v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877 (1989). For a good exegesis of the first three cases in this 
line, see Gill Deford, Melkonyan v. Sullivan: What Hath the Supreme Court 
Wrought?, 25 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 663 (1991). See also Holt v. Shalala, 35 F.3d 
376 (9th Cir. 1994). 
7. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3 (1993); MODEL CODE 
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILFTY DR 4-101 (1983). 
8. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1993); MODEL CODE 
OF PROFESSIONAL R E S P O N S I B ~  DR 4-101. 
9. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3; MODEL CODE OF 
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102, 7-106. 
10. See Memorandum from Jose A. Anglada, Acting United States 
Administrative Law Judge, Dep't of Health and Human Services Office of Hearings 
and Appeals, to Harry C. Taylor, 11, Chief Administrative Law Judge, Charleston, 
West Virginia, Hearing Office (Apr. 14, 1992) (on file with author) [hereinafter U.S. 
ALJ Memorandum]. 
11. See James Podgers, Crumbling Fortress, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1993, a t  50. 
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some fashion12 and a complete lack of judicial precedent in the 
social security context. Compounding the confusion, Congress 
has enacted in the Social Security Independence and Program 
Improvements Act of 1994, effective October 1, 1994, a 
provision to combat fraudulent claims, which contains language 
susceptible to interpretation as shedding either heat or light on 
the subj ect.13 
The scope of this problem is enormous. Again, in the words 
of the Supreme Court, "The system's administrative structure 
and procedures, with essential determinations numbering into 
the millions, are of a size and extent difficult t o  
~omprehend."'~ By 1983, the Social Security Administration's 
administrative law judges ( U s )  were hearing over 320,000 
cases per year.15 In April 1994, SSA projected 522,000 
requests for hearings for the 1994 calendar year? 
In this article I will first attempt to delineate the specific 
nature of the dilemma faced by the social security practitioner 
against the unique background of social security law and 
practice. Second, I will endeavor to identify the pertinent 
provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the 
Rules of Professional Conduct as well as the ambiguities within 
both the Code and the Rules in the social security context. 
Third, I will attempt to  relate and analyze the few formal and 
informal opinions from various state and local bars on the 
subject. Fourth, I will examine arguably related court decisions 
from other areas of the law, such as patent law. Fifth, I will 
posit some tentative answers to the issues involved under the 
Model Rules. Sirtth, I will address the new amendment to  the 
Social Security Act regarding fraudulent claims and its 
potential impact. Next, I will suggest that, pending clarification 
from the courts or the bar or the Social Security 
Administration, the zealous practitioner will best serve her 
clientele by full disclosure of relevant "medical facts." Finally, I 
12. See discussion infra part IV. 
13. Social Security Independence and Program Improvements Act of 1994, 
Pub. L. No. 103-296, 9 206, 108 Stat. 1464, 1509-16 (1994). 
14. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 399 (1971). 
15. Heckler v. Day, 467 U.S. 104, 106 (1984) (citing U.S. DEP? OF HEALTH 
AND HUM. SERVS., OFF. OF HEAFUNGS AND APPEALS, KEY WORKLOAD INDICATORS 1, 
16 N a y  1983)). 
16. Social Security Administration, Process Reengineering Program; Disability 
Reengineering Project Proposal, 59 Fed. Reg. 18,188 (1994) [hereinafter SSA Project 
Proposal]. 
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will suggest the urgent necessity for creation of a regulatory 
framework, either by the Social Security Administration or by 
the state bars, or both, to deal with these problems. 
11. A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL SECURITY LAW AND 
PRACTICE 
Congress has  created two major federal income 
maintenance programs administered by the Social Security 
Administration: Social Security Disability Insurance Benefits 
(SSDIB) under Title I1 of the Social Security A d 7  and 
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) Benefits under Title XVI 
of the Social Security Act.'' Although the financial criteria for 
benefits under these programs are different, the basic 
definition of disability is essentially the same. As statutorily 
defined, "disability" means "inability to engage in any 
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically 
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be 
expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be 
expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 
 month^."'^ 
In other words, unlike, for example, the Veterans 
Disability Benefits System, social security is an all-or-nothing 
system. For social security purposes, either a person is 
completely disabled, and thus meets the medical eligibility 
criteria, or is not disabled. By comparison, veterans seeking 
benefits from the Department of Veterans Affairs may be found 
disabled to a greater or lesser degree under very specific rules 
setting forth percentages of di~ability.~' 
The all-or-nothing nature of the social security system 
vastly magnifies the potential adverse consequences to the 
claimant of even a single medical document suggesting 
malingering, exaggeration, non-compliance with medical care, 
or simply a dispute over medical findings. There is no way for 
the adjudicator or court to "split the difference." By contrast, in 
17. 42 U.S.C. $5 401-433 (1988). 
18. 42 U.S.C. $$ 1381-1399 (1988). For more detail regarding these programs, 
see Richard P. Weishaupt & Robert E. Rains, Sullivan v. Zebley: New Disubility 
Standards for Indigent Children to Obtain Government Benefits, 35 ST. LOUIS U. 
L.J. 539, 540-46 (1991). 
19. 42 U.S.C. Q 423(dXlXA) (1988). This section is applicable to SSI claims 
through 42 U.S.C. $ 1382c(a)(3) (1988). For a modified definition for disability 
based on blindness, see 42 U.S.C. $5 416(iX1), 423(dXl)(B) (1988). 
20. See, e.g., 38 U.S.C. $$ 1114, 1131, 1134 (Supp. 111 1991). 
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V.A. cases (or, by way of another example, workers' 
compensation cases)21 the adjudicator faced with contradictory 
medical information may well determine that  the claimant is 
forty or sixty percent disabled, but not one hundred percent; 
the claimant will then receive some benefits.22 That option is 
not available within the social security system, and thus one 
adverse piece of medical information may lead to a total denial 
of benefits in the social security system whereas it would not in 
other legal contexts. 
The claimant seeking disability benefits is confronted with 
a four-step administrative procedure, theoretically designed for 
the carefid and rigorous assessment of her medical condition, 
but in reality notorious for its intrinsic delays.23 Briefly, the 
original application, although made at the local Social Security 
District Office, is actually examined by a state agency (or 
Bureau of Disability Determination or DDS) acting under 
contract to the Social Security Admini~trat ion.~~ It is 
noteworthy that the applicant, as part of the application 
process, is required to execute medical release forms.25 If the 
applicant is denied a favorable decision at this initial 
determination stage,  t he  applicant may apply for 
"rec~nsideration."~~ Again, while this reconsideration request 
is made a t  the local Social Security District Office, the 
reconsideration is also determined by the state agency rather 
than the Social Security Admini~tration.~' It is quite common 
for claimants to go through the initial determination and 
reconsideration levels pro se without benefit of legal counsel.28 
If the applicant receives an unfavorable decision a t  the 
reconsideration level, she has sixty days in which to request a 
hearing before an  administrative law judge of the Social 
21. See, e.g., PA. STAT. A N N .  tit. 77, $5 512, 513 (1991). 
22. See supra notes 20-21. 
23. For more detail regarding this administrative procedure, see Robert E. 
Rains, A Specialized Court for Social Security? 15 FLA. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1987). For 
the Supreme Court's response to the delays, see Heckler v. Day, 467 U.S. 104, 
110-11 (1984). 
24. See SSA Project Proposal, supm note 16, at 18,188, 18,190, 18,191 (for a 
flowchart of the process); see also 20 C.F.R. §$ 404.601-,641, 404.900-.906, 416.301- 
.335, 416.1001-.1018, 416.1401-.I405 (1994). 
25. Form SSA-827; see also 20 C.F.R. $8 404.1512-.1516, 416.912-.916 (1994). 
26. 20 C.F.R. §$ 404.907-.922, 416.1406-.I422 (1994). 
27. Id.; see also SSA Project Proposal, supra note 16, at 18,192. 
28. See SSA Project Proposal, supm note 16, at 18,189. 
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Security Adminis t ra t i~n.~~ This third administrative level is, 
in reality, the first time that the claim will be heard by an 
entity of the Social Security Administration." For many 
claimants, it is a critical part of the adjudicatory process and 
one in which claimants increasingly are represented by 
co~nsel .~ '  Not surprisingly, it is a t  this level that the 
claimant's representative will most frequently be confronted by 
the ethical dilemma of identification or possession of 
contradictory, if not outright adverse, medical evidence. 
The final administrative determination level is the Social 
Security Appeals Counds2 If the claimant is denied benefits 
at the ALJ level, she has sixty days to seek review of the ALJ's 
decision by the Appeals Council.33 Additionally, the Appeals 
Council may reopen a favorable A U  decision on its own 
motion.34 Unless the Appeals Council remands the case for 
further administrative proceedings, the Appeals Council 
decision constitutes the final decision of the Secretary of the 
United States Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS) with regard to the individual's claim for benefits.35 
Should that determination be adverse, the claimant then has 
sixty days in  which to seek judicial review by filing a complaint 
in federal district court against the Secretary.S6 
29. 20 C.F.R. $$ 404.933, 416.1433 (1994). 
30. Id. §$ 404.944 to .953, 416.1444 to  .1453. 
31. See SSA Project Proposal, supm note 16, at 18,195. 
32. 20 C.F.R. $8 404.967, 416.1467 (1994). 
33. Id. $$ 404.968, 416.1468. 
34. Id. §$ 404.969, 416.1469. 
35. Id. §$ 404.981, 416.1481. Frequently, the adion of the Appeals Council 
takes the format of adopting the decision of the Administrative Law Judge as the 
final decision of the Secretary. See, e.g., Ventura v. Shalala, 862 F. Supp. 1226, 
1228 @. Del. 1994). 
On Aug. 15, 1994, President Clinton signed the Social Security Independence 
and Program Improvements Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-296, 108 Stat. 1464 
(1994), which made the Social Security Administration an independent agency as of 
March 31, 1995. Throughout this article, I have referred to the "Secretary" of the 
United States Department of Health and Human Services as the titular head of 
the Social Security Administration and as the defendant in federal court. Under 
the provisions of this Act, the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration 
is now the titular head of the Social Security Administration and the proper 
defendant in federal court. I have retained all references to the Secretary because, 
until this time, it has been the Secretary who has been ultimately responsible and 
who has been named as defendant. 
36. 20 C.F.R. $8 404.981, 416.1481; see also 42 U.S.C. $3 405(g), 1383(c)(3) 
(1988). 
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The nature of the available judicial review magnifies, once 
again, the potential adverse consequences to the claimant of 
admission into evidence of a potentially adverse medical report. 
The Social Security Act does not allow the courts to conduct a 
de novo review of the record. Rather, judicial review is limited 
t o  determining whether the final decision of the Secretary is 
supported by substantial evidence.37 Substantial evidence has 
been described as "more than a mere scintilla. It means such 
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 
adequate to support a concl~sion."~~ Thus, even though a 
reviewing court concludes that the weight or preponderance of 
the evidence indicates that the claimant is disabled, the court 
theoretically should deny benefits if there is substantial 
evidence contradicting that conclusion.3g It is quite possible 
that one adverse medical report could constitute such 
substantial evidence and prove fatal to the claim.40 Even if 
the reviewing court reverses the denial of benefits, the 
claimant will have been forced to wait a very considerable 
period of time for critically needed income." 
111. PERTINENT PROVISIONS OF THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL 
~SPONSIBILITY AND RULES OF ~OFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
At the time of this writing, a majority of states have 
adopted some version of the ABA's Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct.42 Twelve states, however, continue to  adhere to some 
37. 42 U.S.C. $ 405(g) (1988). 
38. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated 
Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 US. 197, 229 (1938)). 
39. See id.; 42 U.S.C. 8 405(g). "However, substantial evidence is less than 
the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent 
conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency's finding 
from being supported by substantial evidence." Cunning v. Harris, 505 F. Supp. 16, 
17 (W.D. Okla. 1980). 
40. "'Substantial' evidence is more than a scintilla but less than a 
preponderance of the evidence. It must do more than create a suspicion of the 
existence of the fad to  be established, but 'no substantial evidence' can be found 
only when there is a %onspicuous absence of credible choices' or 'no contrary 
medical evidence.'" Shannon v. Califano, 485 F. Supp. 939, 940 (N.D. Tex. 1980) 
(emphasis added) (citations omitted). Not all courts take such a rigid position. See 
Brewster v. Heckler, 786 F.2d 581, 584 (3d Cir. 1986). 
41. For an idea of a disabled person's dire need for federal benefits, see 
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 US. 319, 350 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting), and 
Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 430-31 (1988) ( B r e ~ a n ,  J., dissenting). 
42. See SELECTED $TATUTES, RULES AND STANDARDS ON THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION 231-32 (John S. Dzienkowski ed., 1993). 
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form of the Model Code of Professional Resp~nsibility.'~ Both 
the Rules and the Code have provisions which relate in some 
way to  assiduous representation, client confidentiality and the 
scope of an advocate's duty to identify and produce adverse 
evidence. 
Under the Model Code, Canon 7 provides that "A lawyer 
should represent a client zealously within the bounds of the 
law."44 The Model Rules require "diligence" rather than 
zealousness per se. Rule 1.3 states, "A lawyer shall act with 
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a 
client."45 The ABA comment states, "A lawyer should act with 
commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and 
with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf."46 
Both the Code and the Rules dictate the preservation of 
the confidentiality of information obtained from or about 
clients. Canon 4 of the ABA Model Code states, "A lawyer 
should preserve the confidences and secrets of a ~lient."~' The 
prohibition on revealing "secretsy' is particularly important in 
this context. DR 4-101(A) states that a "'secret' refers to  other 
information gained in the professional relationship that the 
client has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which 
would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental t o  
the client? Typically an adverse medical report would fall 
within this definition of "secret." 
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct contain a similar, 
but not identical, provision. Rule 1.6(a) provides that "[a] 
lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation 
of a client unless the client consents after consultation, except 
for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to  carry 
out the representation . . . .'M9 
Neither the dictate of confidentiality, however, nor that of 
diligence/zealousness is absolute. Under DR 4-101(C)(2), "A 
lawyer may reveal . . . [c]o&dences or secrets when permitted 
43. Id. See also AMERICAN BAR ASS'N & THE BUREAU OF NAT'L AFF., 
ABAIBNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 01:301 (1991) [hereinafter 
~TANUAL ON PF~OFESSIONAL CONDUCT]. 
44. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1983). 
45. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3 (1993) 
46. Id. 
47. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIL~IY Canon 4. 
48. Id. DR 4-101. 
49. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(a). 
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under Disciplinary Rules or required by law or court order."50 
Ethical Consideration 7-27 mandates that, "Because it 
interferes with the proper administration of justice, a lawyer 
should not suppress evidence that he or his client has a legal 
obligation to  reveal or produce.'"' Likewise, DR 7-102(A)(3) 
mandates, "In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall 
not: . . . (3) [clonceal or knowingly fail to  disclose that which he 
is required by law to  reveal."52 Nor may a lawyer "[c]ounsel or 
assist his client in conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal 
o r  fra~dulent."~~ 
Under the Model Rules, there are several provisions 
limiting zealousness and confidentiality. Rule 8.4(c) declares 
that it is professional misconduct to  "engage in conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or mi~representation."~~ 
Likewise, Rule 1.2(d) prohibits assisting or counseling a client 
to engage in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or 
f ra~dulen t .~~  Rule 4.l(b) mandates that a lawyer shall not 
knowingly "fail to disclose a material fact to  a third person 
when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or 
fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited by 
rule 1 .6."56 
The provision of the Model Rules most pertinent to the 
social security advocate's dilemma is Rule 3.3, "Candor Toward 
the Tribunal."57 The "Legal Background" to Rule 3.3 clearly 
anticipates that a tribunal can be either a judicial or an 
administrative proceeding: 
Rule 3.3 imposes a duty of candor on a lawyer appearing 
before a tribunal in a court of law or adjudicative proceeding. 
While the term "tribunal" is not defined in the [tlerminology 
section of the Rules, or in Rule 3.3 or its Comment, the 
context in which the term is used in the Rules makes it clear 
that "tribunal" refers to a trial-type proceeding in which 
witnesses are questioned, evidence is presented, the parties 
and their counsel participate fully, and the decision is 
rendered by a fact finder." 
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101. 
Id. EC 7-27. 
Id. DR 7-102. 
Id. 
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4(c). 
Id. Rule 1.2(d). 
Id. Rule 4.103). 
Id. Rule 3.3. 
ANN. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 334 (Jeanne P. Gray ed., 
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Against this legal background, it is difficult to argue that an 
ALJ proceeding is not a proceeding before a tribunal. 
Rule 3,3(a)(2) states that a "[l]awyer shall not 
knowingly . . . fail to disclose a material fact to  a tribunal when 
disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or 
fraudulent act by the client."59 In an ex parte proceeding the 
standard is even higher. Rule 3.3(d) mandates, Yn an ex parte 
proceeding, a lawyer shall inform the tribunal of all material 
facts known to the lawyer which will enable the tribunal to 
make an informed decision, whether or not the facts are 
adverse."60 Unfortunately, the term "ex parte proceeding" is 
not defined either in this section or in the terminology section 
of the Model R ~ l e s . ~ '  The official Comment to the Model Rules 
provides the following explanation of "ex parte proceedings:" 
Ordinarily, an advocate has the limited responsibility of 
presenting one side of the matters that a tribunal should 
consider in reaching a decision; the conflicting position is 
expected to be presented by the opposing party. However, in 
an ex parte proceeding, such as an application for a temporary 
restraining order, there is no balance of presentation by 
opposing advocates. The object of an ex parte proceeding is 
nevertheless to yield a substantially just result. The judge has 
an affirmative responsibility to accord the absent party just 
consideration. The lawyer for the represented party has the 
correlative duty to make disclosures of material facts known 
to the lawyer and that the lawyer reasonably believes are 
necessary to an informed decision." 
The key question then is whether a social security hearing 
is an ex parte proceeding within the meaning of the Model 
Rules. To address this question, it is necessary to take a more 
detailed look a t  Social Security Administrative Law Judge 
hearings. 
The United States Supreme Court has addressed the 
nature of social security hearings in detail only once, in 
Richardson v. Perales." In some ways, the case is as 
signdicant for what it did not hold as for what it did hold. The 
2d ed. 1992) [hereinafter MODEL RULES]. 
59. Id. at 329. 
60. Id. (emphasis added). 
61. Id. at 11. 
62. Id. at 332. 
63. 402 U.S. 389, 399 (1971). 
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Court declined to determine how or whether social security 
hearings fit within the Federal Administrative Procedures Act: 
'We need not decide whether the APA has general application 
to social security disability claims, for the social security 
administrative procedure does not vary from that prescribed by 
the APA."64 The Court opined that "the agency operates 
essentially, and is intended so to do, as an adjudicator and not 
as an advocate or adver~ary."~ This language has given rise 
to the oft-quoted doctrine that social security hearings are 
"nonadversarial" in nature? 
In Perales, the claimant challenged the fairness of the 
hearing procedures, inter alia, on due process grounds: 
He says that the hearing examiner has the responsibility for 
gathering the evidence and "to make the Government's case 
as strong as possible"; that naturally he leans toward a 
decision in favor of the evidence he has gathered; that justice 
must satisfy the appearance of justice, citing Offutt v. United 
States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954), and In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 
133, 136 (1955); and that an "independent hearing examiner 
such as in the" Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' 
Compensation Act should be provided.67 
The Court rejected this assertion: 
Neither are we persuaded by the advocate-judge-multiple-hat 
suggestion. It assumes too much and would bring down too 
many procedures designed, and working well, for a 
governmental structure of great and growing complexity. The 
social security hearing examiner, fbrthermore, does not act as 
counsel. He acts as an examiner charged with developing the 
facts? 
But, while the Court has upheld the role of the Social Security 
ALJ, unquestionably the ALJ's position in a social security 
hearing is significantly different from that of a trial judge in a 
temporary restraining order (TRO) proceeding. The AW is an 
employee of the federal entity from whom the claimant is 
64. Id. at 409. 
65. Id. at 403. 
66. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877, 891 (1989). 
67. PeruLes, 402 U.S. at 408-09. Social Security Administration hearings are 
now presided over by administrative law judges, not hearing examiners. See 
Hudson, 490 U.S. at 879. 
68. Perales, 402 U.S. at 410. 
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seeking a monetary award? The ALJ's employer will be the 
defendant in federal court should the claimant be denied 
benefits administratively and file a complaint for judicial 
review.?' Not only is the AW technically an employee of this 
potentially interested inchoate party, but HHS's employer- 
employee relationship with the ALJs is an unusual one in a 
judicial context.71 
For example, if one were to sue an executive entity of the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in the appropriate state court 
(usually the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania), one would 
understand that the presiding judiciary would be employees of 
the Commonwealth, albeit of an entirely independent branch of 
state government with a set salary and fixed term of office. In 
contrast, the ALJ is not only employed by the same department 
as SSA, but-despite protestations of independence-is 
somewhat controlled by purportedly higher authority within 
that  department. This effort at control is nowhere clearer than 
in  the context of acquiescence/nonacquiescence in decisions of 
the circuit courts of appeal. There is a long and unfortunate 
history of SSA taking the position that i t  is not bound by 
precedentid decisions of the circuit courts, sometimes even 
within the circuit that issued the decision, and regardless of 
whether the Secretary had sought a writ of certiorari from the 
Supreme Court to review the case. SSA now publishes 
"Acquiescence Rulings" indicating which circuit court decisions 
it will abide by and within which circuit(s)-if not 
nationally-it will abide by a ruling.72 Recently, the Office of 
Hearings and Appeals (OHA) Associate Commissioner sent a 
memorandum to all ALJs directing them that they may not 
rely upon, or use as authority, a circuit court decision that 
would be favorable to a claimant if SSA has not "acquiesced" in 
that  decision, even if the claimant's case is being heard within 
69. There have been repeated attempts to create an independent ALJ corps. 
On Nov. 19, 1993, the Senate passed S. 486, which would place all U s  in a 
unified corps. See Senate Passes Measure Creating Independent AW Corps, Soc. 
SECURITY F., Nov.-Dec. 1993, at 1, 4. 
70. 42 U.S.C. 9 405(g) (1988). See also Recent Congresswna2 Attention on 
Independent Agency, SSKs Backdog of Disability Reviews, and QualiCy of Notices, 
SOC. SECURITY F., Mar. 1994, at 1, 7. 
71. See Rains, supra note 23, at 12-13. At times that relationship has been 
stormy. During the era of "Bellmon Reviews" in the early 1980s, the Association of 
Administrative Law Judges sued the Secretary of Health and Human Services and 
high SSA officials alleging illegal interference with their independence. 
72. Id. at 8-10; see also 20 C.F.R. $9 404.985, 416.1485 (1994). 
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that circuit!73 One would hardly expect a court administrator 
to  purport to  instruct trial court judges which appellate 
decisions they are allowed to utilize, much less expect that any 
trial judge would feel bound by such an instruction. This would 
be all the more remarkable in a lawsuit in which the court 
administrator was a party in interest. 
The ALJ is different from the trial judge hearing a TRO in 
another important respect. A TRO is typically presented with 
little advance warning to a neutral judge who has little, if any, 
ability to discover underlying inf~rmation.~' By comparison, 
the current national average is for the ALJ hearing process to  
take 265 days.?' Even if one assumed a two-month delay from 
the date of the hearing until the issuance of the decision, the 
case would be before the OHA for some 200 days before the 
ALJ hearing. After the case is assigned to  an individual ALJ, 
the ALJ receives a significant record already compiled by the 
state agency." She is hardly the tabula rasa we expect of a 
trial judge hearing a TRO. Moreover, the ALJ has an 
independent duty to develop the case,?? and extraordinary 
discovery tools for doing so. The claimant is supposed to  submit 
evidence in advance of the hearing, if possible.78 The ALJ can 
require a claimant to  submit to  one or more "consultative 
[medical] evaluations" from her own doctor or one under 
contract to  the state agency.7g The ALJ can, and often does, 
contact claimants' counsel prior to  a hearing and request or 
demand additional medical records which she perceives to be 
73. No Application of Circuit Caselaw Without an Acquiescence Ruling, SOC. 
SECURITY F., Mar. 1994, at 12-13. This raises an interesting question: could an 
AW, who theoretically is guaranteed quasi-judicial independence, be disciplined in 
some fashion by the SSA for citing and using a circuit court opinion in a decision 
to make a ruling favorable to a claimant? 
74. See FED. R. CN. P. 65(b); Fengler v. Numismatic Americana, Inc., 832 
F.2d 745, 747 (2d Cir. 1987). 
75. See SSA Project Proposal, supra note 16, at 18,195. 
76. 20 C.F.R. $$ 404.1512(d), 416.912(d) (1994). 
77. "'The AWs duties are heightened when a claimant is pro se, but exist 
even when a claimant is represented by counsel.'" Fishburn v. Sullivan, 802 F. 
Supp. 1018, 1025-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (quoting Walker v. Heckler, 588 F. Supp. 819, 
824 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)). "'The fad that a claimant is represented by counsel does not 
absolve the ALJ &om his abiding responsibility to develop fully the fads of the 
claimant's case in a nonadversarial fashion consistent with the broadly remedial 
purposes of the Social Security Act.'" Id. at 1026 (quoting Masella v. Heckler, 592 
F. Supp. 621, 624 (W.DN.Y. 1984)). 
78. 20 C.F.R. $8 404.935, 416.1435 (1994). 
79. Id. $8 404.1517, 416.917. 
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lacking.80 The ALJ may also direct the attendance and 
testimony of expert witnesses-vocational experts and, less 
frequently, medical experts-at  hearing^.^' The ALJ may 
issue subpoenas on her own initiative to  other witnesses to 
appear and t e ~ t i ~ . ' ~  If the ALJ is dissatisfied with the 
completeness of the record at the close of the hearing, she may 
use any or all of these discovery tools after the hearing and 
convene a subsequent hearing or hearings as she deems fites3 
Given the duty of the ALJ to  develop the record fully, and 
the means available for doing so, it is debatable whether there 
is an unrepresented interested party at an ALJ hearing as 
there is in the classic ex parte proceeding. (It is true that the 
Social Security Administration does not have counsel present 
at the hearing to present a case against the claimant. An  
experiment with such a government representative program in 
the 1980s was abandoned in the face of much criticism.)* 
While undoubtedly the Social Security Administration is an 
inchoate party, in the many ways set forth above, the ALJ, and 
the OHA staff, actively ensure the fullness of the record. ALJs 
have the ability, indeed the duty, to avoid the intrinsic danger 
of an ex parte hearing, that critical information favorable to 
the absent party will be kept from the tribunal. Presumably 
this danger is the key concern behind Model Rule 3.3(d). 
Finally, yet another critical distinction exists between a 
social security hearing and an application for a TRO. In the 
typical TRO proceeding there is great pressure on the court to 
issue an immediate decision to  avert immediate irreparable 
harm (or to deny the request)? By comparison, although 
claimants are entitled to a prompt decision and are often in 
dire need of the benefits they are seeking, no time limit is 
imposed on the ALJ for issuing a decision even after the long- 
80. Presumably this authority is based upon 20 C.F.R. $$ 404.1512(c), 
404.1710, 416.912(c), 416.1510 (1994). 
81. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 395-96 (1971). 
82. 20 C.F.R. $$ 404.950(d), 416.1450(d) (1994). 
83. Id. $5 404.944, 416.1444. In recent years, however, some ALJs have 
complained that an SSA managerial decision to take away their authority over 
OHA support staff has prevented them from adequately developing cases. See 
Christine M. Moore, SSA Disability Adjudication in Crisis!, JUDGES' J., Summer 
1994, at 2, 40-42. 
84. Unconstitutional: Government Representative Program Enjoined, Sot. 
S E C U R ~  F., July 1986, at 1-5; Government Representative Project Discontinued, 
SOC. S E C U R ~  F., Apr. 1987, at 1, 1. 
85. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
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awaited hearing?' There is little, if any, danger of the ALJ 
being rushed into a hurried decision based on an incomplete 
record, as social security's own statistics demonstrate." 
In short, in many ways social security hearings are truly 
sui gener is. 
IV. STATE AND LOCAL BAR INTERPRETATIONS 
As noted, the bars in a few states have grappled with the 
quandary of the advocate's duty in this context. The resulting 
opinions vary in degree of formality, depth of analysis, and 
ultimate conclusion. 
A. Alabama 
In a brief opinion published in July 1993, the General 
Counsel of the Alabama State Bar Disciplinary Commission 
unequivocally held that "Rule 3.3(d) of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct of the Alabama State Bar applies to  lawyers partici- 
pating in hearings before a Social Security Administrative Law 
Judge adjudicating social security disability, retirement and 
survivor claims."88 In reaching this conclusion, the General 
Counsel relied upon Professors Hazard and Hodes' handbook, 
The Modern Rules of Professional Conduct, and its general 
discussion of ex parte proceedings (which does not address 
social security proceedings), as well as one patent case." 
B. Missouri 
In 1989, a private practitioner in Missouri requested an 
opinion from the Missouri Bar Ethics Committee as to  whether 
he was under a duty to disclose to  a Social Security ALJ depo- 
sitions in his possession which were taken in civil litigation 
prior to  the filing of his client's disability claim. The attorney 
stated that in his opinion, "some would be helpful in her social 
security case, some would not matter one way or another, and 
86. Heckler v. Day, 467 U.S. 104, 106, 116-17 (1984). 
87. See SSA Project Proposal, supra note 16, at 18,195; text accompanying 
note 75. 
88. Robert W. Norris, Opinions of the General Counsel, 54 ALA. LAW. 252, 252 
(1993). 
89. Id. at 252-53 (citing Pfizer and Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 401 
F.2d 574, 579 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 920 (1969)). 
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a few would be harmful."90 The General Chairman of the Mis- 
souri Bar Administration Advisory Committee responded: 
It is the opinion of the Advisory Committee that a lawyer 
has no duty to defeat his own case. While it would be an 
ethical violation to violate the provisions of Rule 3.3 of (sic) 
Rule 4, we do not believe the duty exists to present every 
shred of evidence known supporting every or all positions 
possible in litigati~n.~' 
No further explanation, rationale or authority was provided in 
the opinion. 
C. New York County 
In 1993, the Committee on Professional Ethics of the New 
York County Lawyers Association was presented with the ques- 
tion of whether a lawyer representing claimants seeking social 
security benefits "is obliged to produce all relevant medical 
information about the claimant in this process, including infor- 
mation obtained from the clients which may be detrimental to 
the clients' claims, if no request is made for the informa- 
t i ~ n ? ~  
The committee addressed this issue under New York 
State's Code of Professional Responsibility which is in fact a 
hybrid of the Model Code and the Model ~ u l e s . ' ~  In a well- 
reasoned opinion, the committee made a number of points. I t  
began by noting the potential conflict between a lawyer's duty 
under Canon 4 to preserve client confidences and secrets and 
the lawyer's duty under Canon 7 to represent a client zealously 
within the bounds of the law. "Whether these interests collide 
in the circumstances presented depends on whether the disclo- 
sure of medical information is necessary to avoid the lawyer's 
presentation of a false claim for disability  benefit^."'^ 
The committee's opinion disclaimed any reliance upon the 
Social Security Act and SSA regulations. The opinion addressed 
90. Letter from Dewey L. Crepeau, Partner, Crepeau & Roberts, to Harold 
Barrick, Missouri Bar Ethics Committee 1 (April 7, 1989) (on file with author). 
91. Letter from Harold W. Banick, General Chairman, Missouri Bar Adminis- 
tration, to Dewey L. Crepeau, Partner, Crepeau & Roberts 1 (April 19, 1989) (on 
file with author). 
92. Comm. on &of. Ethics of the N.Y. County Lawyers' Ass'n, New York 
County Lawyers' Ethics Opinion, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 9, 1993, at 2. 
93. MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, supra note 43, at 01:38-01:40. 
94. New York County Lawyers' Ethics Opinion, supra note 92, at 2. 
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solely the lawyer's obligation under New York State's Code. 
The opinion noted, however, that "a lawyer must comply with 
the letter and the spirit of any statutes and regulations gov- 
erning disclosure in proceedings for social security benefits."95 
Having made that disclaimer, the committee opined, 
If no law independently mandates disclosure, then nothing in 
the Code requires a lawyer to volunteer evidence-even evi- 
dence relevant to the matter in issue-to a tribunal or other 
person before whom the lawyer appears on behalf of a client. 
A lawyer's obligation is to present whatever evidence exists 
which, in the lawyer's professional judgment, best advances 
the client's interests in the proceeding. That the lawyer may 
have been given access by the client to other evidence that 
does not support the client's position does not alter this obli- 
gation. To the contrary, if such other evidence is provided by, 
or upon instructions from, the client, the lawyer may have a 
duty not to disclose such evidence.96 
The opinion went on, however, to  add several important 
caveats. First, the opinion noted: 
A lawyer need not volunteer relevant evidence harmful to a 
client's interests, but neither may a lawyer knowingly make a 
false statement of fact, use perjured testimony or false evi- 
dence, or assist a client in fraudulent conduct. DR 7- 
102(A)(4), (5) & (7). If a lawyer is able to advance a good faith 
claim for benefits despite knowledge of contrary medical re- 
ports, and if none of the evidence or statements made in sup- 
port of that claim is known to be false in light of such knowl- 
edge, then nothing in the Code precludes assertion of the 
claim. If, however, the lawyer's knowledge of the adverse 
medical information constitutes knowledge that the claim 
itself is  false, then the lawyer is not free to advance the claim 
and must withdraw from the representation.g7 
Also, the opinion addressed situations where a doctor has 
issued two opinions with regard to a client which could appear 
to be contradictory. In the first situation, the doctor's opinion 
used language which has a technical meaning within the social 
security regulations, the attorney went back to  the doctor and 
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and the doctor issued a second opinion which was intended to 
clarify and revise the first. Based upon these facts and circum- 
stances, the lawyer would have no reason to  believe that the 
doctor's intention in issuing the second opinion was anything 
other than to correct an unintentional error in the f i s t  report. 
In that case it would be appropriate for the lawyer to submit 
only the second opinion.'' 
The committee compared that situation to another scenario 
where a second report from a medical treating source conflicts 
with a first report and clearly is intended to rescind that prior 
report. In that scenario, the committee opined: 
the lawyer could not reasonably rely on the first report as a 
basis for proceeding with the claim. In that circumstance, the 
lawyer would not be free to offer only the first opinion as evi- 
dence, for to do so would be to present evidence that the law- 
yer knows to be untrue?' 
Finally the opinion noted, "There are also circumstances 
when the lawyer either must produce both medical opinions or 
may produce neither opinion, even if the opinions are not con- 
tradictory. Truth cannot be measured in a vacuum."100 
The committee concluded that "[slubject to  the quallica- 
tions set forth above, a lawyer representing a claimant in a 
social security disability hearing is not obligated to produce all 
relevant medical information if no request is made for such 
information and such information does not constitute knowl- 
edge that the claim is false."lO' 
D. Virginia 
In 1992, a Social Security Administrative Law Judge 
lodged a complaint with the Virginia State Bar asserting that a 
private attorney was in direct violation of Virginia DR 7- 
105(A), in refusing to  comply with an order which the ALJ had 
issued directing the attorney t o  "submit any and all documen- 
tation in his possession pertaining to [a] claimant's alleged 
physical and mental impairments . . . so that a determination 
can be made as to  whether said documentation is material to 





102. The Court's Order of April 9, 1992, directing claimant's counsel to submit 
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stating the position of his firm that it would comply with any 
request for "[alny specific medical record generated in the nor- 
mal course of health care delivery . . . [and] [alny report from a 
doctor addressing topics you specify."'03 The attorney went on 
to  state, "Except as noted above, we will not state whether or 
not we have supplied all medical evidence and we will not 
supply medical evidence which undermines a claimant's 
claim."'04 In support of this position, the attorney relied upon 
social security regulations and sub-regulatory material. The 
regulation states, "If you do not give us the medical and other 
evidence that we need and request, we will have to make a 
decision based on information available in your case."lo5 A 
sub-regulatory document, HALLEX 6 1-2-524, mandates that 
"[a] claimant's failure or refusal to submit existing evidence 
that an ALJ needs and request [sic] is not a basis for denying 
the claim or dismissing the RH.'06 Rather, the ALJ must 
make a decision based on the evidence available in the 
case."'07 The attorney also expressed the concern that the 
judge's order would place a claimant represented by counsel at 
a comparative disadvantage to a pro se claimant.'" This is 
because an aggressive and conscientious attorney will usually 
obtain more documents than the typical pro se claimant. Some 
of those documents could come back to  haunt the claimant. 
Finally, the attorney pointed out the ALJ's authority to subpoe- 
na specific records and to obtain consultative examinations.'" 
In a thoughtful letter opinion, the Assistant Bar Counsel of 
the Virginia State Bar informed the ALJ that the attorney's 
actions did not constitute misconduct under Virginia Disciplin- 
ary Rule 7-105 and that the state bar would take no further 
action in the matter.''' It is noteworthy, however, that the 
Virginia State Bar opinion does not purport to decide the ulti- 
evidence (on file with author). 
103. Letter from Charles H. Cuthbert, Jr., Partner, Cuthbert Law Offices, P.C., 
to an Administrative Law Judge, Social Security Administration 1 (Mar. 26, 1992) 
(on file with author). 
104. Id. 
105. Id. at 2 (citing 20 C.F.R. 5 404.1516 (1994)) (emphasis omitted). 
106. "RH" refers to a Request for a Hearing. 
107. SSA HAUEX 5 1-2-524 (citing 21 C.F.R. $5 404.1516, 416.916). 
108. Letter from Charles H. Cuthbert, Jr., supra note 103, at 1. 
109. Id. at 3. 
110. Letter from Richard C. Vorhis, Assistant Bar Counsel, Virginia State Bar, 
to an Administrative Law Judge, Social Security Administration (Aug. 18, 1992) (on 
file with author). 
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mate issue of the attorney's obligation to produce the docu- 
ments. The opinion cited Virginia Disciplinary Rule 7-105(A), 
which states, "a lawyer shall not disregard or advise his client 
to  disregard . . . a ruling of a tribunal made in the course for 
[sic] proceeding, but he may take appropriate steps in good 
faith to  test the validity of such rule or ruling.""' The Bar 
Counsel noted that the relevant question therefore is whether 
the attorney was taking appropriate steps in good faith to test 
the validity of such a ruling.lU 
The Bar Counsel then noted the attorney's dilemma. Under 
Canon 4 the attorney is required to  preserve the client's confi- 
dences and secrets. 
The dilemma is particularly harsh in that if [the attorney] 
should reveal the secrets of his client, he would likely be 
facing a misconduct proceeding on the violation of the rules 
regarding confidences and secrets. Furthermore, he would be 
placed in the situation of not being able to validly contest the 
ruling since once the information is disclosed, the effect can- 
not be retracted even on appeal, and therefore would be likely 
considered moot.lf3 
The opinion concluded: 
Since there is no final order in any of the proceedings effected 
[sic] that [the attorney] could legally pursue on appeal, [the 
attorney] would appear to be proceeding in the only way that 
he presently can to  take appropriate steps in good faith to 
test the validity of your ruling."' 
Under the circumstances, the Virginia Bar Counsel found that 
"whether or not [the attorney] is legally correct in his reading 
of the applicable laws concerning these proceedings, his actions 
do not constitute misconduct in regard to  Disciplinary Rule 7- 
1 0 5 . " ~ ~ ~  
111. Id. at 2 (quoting MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILFTY DR 7- 
1 M W .  
112. Id. 
113. Id. at 2. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. at 3. 
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E. West Virginia 
A variation of the same issues arose in West Virginia in 
1991, which ultimately involved higher officials within the 
Social Security Administration. The acting Hearing Office Chief 
Administrative Law Judge of the Charleston OHA had pro- 
posed a standard "Pre-Hearing Order'' to  be issued to  represen- 
tatives upon receipt of a request for hearing and prior to as- 
signment of the case to an individual ALJ.l16 Claimants' rep- 
resentatives took exception to paragraph 3 of the proposed Pre- 
Hearing Order which would have required the representative 
to  submit the following: 
All relevant medical evidence as set forth in 20 C.F.R. 
404.15131416.913, including medical work-related assessments 
and updated clinical records from treating physicians, when 
the same can reasonably be produced. If a representative 
knows that available evidence exists which is material to the 
issue of disability, the representative shall submit such evi- 
dence to the Administrative Law Judge who adjudicates the 
case, unless the representative identifies good cause for not 
submitting the specific evidence and timely petitions the 
Administrative Law Judge in writing. 
Several members of the Charleston Bar who represent 
social security claimants signed a letter to the Charleston Act- 
ing Chief ALJ in November 1991 setting forth their objections 
to this proposed language.11s The attorneys forcefully articu- 
lated the position that they "have an obligation to present evi- 
dence which is in the best interests of our client and which 
proves the existence of an impairment and his (her) resulting 
disability. We are not charged with the duty, obligation or re- 
sponsibility to  disprove disability."11g 
They then proposed that the West Virginia State Bar adopt 
a resolution in opposition to a lawyer having a duty to submit 
adverse evidence in a social security pr~ceeding.'~~ Following 
116. [Proposed] Pre-Hearing Order issued by Charleston, West Virginia, Ofice 
of Hearings and Appeals, Social Security Administration (on file with the author). 
117. Id. at 2. 
118. Letter from Frederick G. Barkus, et al., Partner, Bickley, Jacobs & 
Barkus, to Charlie Paul Andrus, Acting Chief Administrative Law Judge, Charles- 
ton, West Virginia, Office of Hearings and Appeals (Nov. 7, 1991) (on file with 
author). 
119. Id. at 2. 
120. Id. 
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a number of meetings, the Acting Chief Administrative Law 
Judge for the United States issued a memorandum to the in- 
coming Charleston Hearing Office Chief Administrative Law 
Judge, addressing various issues raised in the ~ontroversy.'~~ 
This memorandum expressed a number of concerns with regard 
t o  the formality of the proposed Re-Hearing Order, delays in 
scheduling hearings that it would cause, and the proposed re- 
quirement of submitting evidence in advance of hearings.'= 
Addressing the issue of an attorney's duty to  produce ad- 
verse evidence and the proposed West Virginia State Bar Reso- 
lution, the Acting Chief ALJ for the United States stated his 
opposition to the principle that an attorney does not have a 
duty to  submit such evidence. He cited a number of reasons. 
First, the U.S. Acting Chief noted that "the AW as fact finder 
is not asking the attorney t o  divulge any information that the 
Judge is not already entitled to."'2P He added, "I note that it 
has been a long-standing maxim of evidence law that the refus- 
al or  failure to bring before the tribunal a document whose 
contents are material or relevant to the issues of the case per- 
mits the tribunal to  infer that the tenor of the document is 
unfavorable to the party's cause."'24 Furthermore, "[a] 
representative's refusal to submit material medical evidence to  
an ALJ also cannot be reconciled with Rule 3.3 of the American 
Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional C~nduct."'~~ 
The memorandum opined that "[tlhe Social Security disability 
hearing is analogous to an ex parte proceeding, in that the 
hearing is nonadversarial in nature, i.e., the Agency is not 
repre~ented."'~ 
Importantly, however, the U.S. Acting Chief Judge was 
careful to  add, "my beliefs are based on an initial review and 
analysis of pertinent law and poli~y."'~' He noted that he had 
also discovered "at least one agency policy statement (which is 
somewhat dated) which suggests a contrary concl~sion."'~~ He 
121. U.S. ALJ Memorandum, supra note 10. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. at 3. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. (citing rule 3.3(d) relating to ex parte proceedings and adverse fads). 
126. Id. at 3-4. 
127. Id. at 4. Presumably, this is a reference to HALLEX 8 1-2-524, cited by 
the Virginia attorney in his response to the AU. See supra notes 103-109 and 
accompanying text. 
128. Id 
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stated that he was going "to request the Associate Commission- 
er to request an opinion of the Office of General Counsel on the 
Notwithstanding the U.S. Acting Chief Judge's reserva- 
tions, the West Virginia State Bar Board of Governors finally 
approved a resolution in April 1992 formally opposing that 
portion of paragraph 3 of the proposed hearing order, 
which purports to require claimant's [sic] attorneys or repre- 
sentatives to obtain and submit evidence which may be ad- 
verse to their respective clients' interests. The State Bar is of 
the opinion that such a requirement is contrary to the obliga- 
tion of the claimant's attorney to zealously represent his or 
her client and tends to denigrate the advocacy role and con- 
vert the attorney into an arm of the administration.lsO 
V. COURT DECISIONS ON EX PARTE PFtOcEEDINGS AND 
ADVERSE EVIDENCE 
There appears to  be a complete lack of judicial precedent 
on the key issue addressed in this article, the duty of an attor- 
ney in a social security proceeding to  produce evidence which is 
adverse to  his client's claim of disability. Thus far, this has 
been a classic example of a legal question capable of repetition 
yet evading review. None of the various state opinions on the 
subject cite any judicial authority within the social security 
area. The Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct of the 
Center of Professional Responsibility of the ABA, in its expla- 
nation of paragraph (d) of Rule 3.3, cites a number of cases on 
ex parte proceedings and adverse evidence, none of which arise 
in the social security field.13' Similarly, The Law of Lawyer- 
ing, A Handbook on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, in 
its discussion of the duty of disclosure in ex parte proceedings 
makes no reference to social security proceedings or cases at 
all.la2 There is no authority which indicates that Rule 3.3.(d) 
was intended to  apply to  a social security administrative pro- 
ceeding, or that the drafters of the Model Rules even contem- 
129. Id. 
130. Resolution of the West Virginia State Bar (Apr. 23, 1992) (on file with 
author). 
131. MODEL RULES, supra note 58, at 347. 
132. 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR.& W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYER- 
ING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 579-80, 619 
(2d ed. Supp. 1992). 
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plated the application of Rule 3.3(d) to social security proceed- 
ings? Obviously, this does not answer the question as to 
whether Rule 3.3(d) logically should be applied to social securi- 
ty proceedings. 
The various cases cited by the authorities and commenta- 
tors in  support of Rule 3.3(d) fall into several categories. There 
are several cases involving motions for default judgment where 
critical information was kept from the court, situations involv- 
ing nonmeritorious claims to a court, situations where there 
has been concealment in discovery, and others involving con- 
cealment of matters relating to fee arrangements with clients. 
The most frequently cited are patent cases. All of these cases 
arguably have some bearing on social security practice, but all 
likewise are markedly distinct from social security practice. 
The Annotated Model Rules cites the following cases in its 
Legal Background for Rule 3.3(d). 
In  Addison v. Brown,'34 an attorney filed a writ to pro- 
hibit a trial on behalf of criminal defendants alleging a viola- 
tion of Florida's speedy trial rule. The writ was filed late on a 
Friday afternoon, and the trial was supposed to commence the 
following Monday. Despite the inconvenience, the court ordered 
a stay and therefore the trial was postponed. Subsequently, the 
court found out that the petition for the writ omitted critical 
information which counsel knew or should have known: the 
petitioners had obtained three or more continuances and "had 
specifically waived speedy trial under the rule."'" The Dis- 
trict Court of Appeals opined, 'While an attorney always car- 
ries a duty and obligation of candor with the court . . . this is 
especially iinportant when the relief requested is urgently 
sought and the time insufficient to allow the opposition to pres- 
ent a respon~e."'~~ Under the circumstances, the District 
Court of Appeals imposed sanctions against the attorney which 
were upheld on appeal per curiam by the Florida Supreme 
Court. Clearly, the exigencies of the situation, involving a last 
minute writ to prohibit a criminal trial, are far more akin to a 
133. A recent student note detailing the legislative history of Model Rule 3.3(d) 
reaches the same conclusion sub silentio; there is no reference to social security 
practice or caselaw in the deliberative processes leading to promulgation of the 
Rule. Jill M. Dennis, Note, The Model Rules and the Search for Truth: The Origins 
and Applications of Model Rule 3.3(d), 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 157 (1994). 
134. 413 So. 2d 1240 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982). 
135. Id. at 1241. 
136. Id. (citations omitted). 
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typical TRO proceeding than to practice before a Social Securi- 
ty ALJ. 
In re Rer~sch'~' also arose in a criminal context. A crimi- 
nal defendant had retained private counsel on a limited basis 
and also sought the services of the public defender's office. This 
caused the trial judge concern about the defendant's status as 
an indigent and whether the defendant's assets would be avail- 
able to satisfy a county lien for court appointed attorney's fees 
before they would be available to pay private attorney fees. The 
judge questioned the private attorney as to  what his consider- 
ation had been thus far in representation, to  which the attor- 
ney replied, ''Not. a penny."ls8 While this might have been lit- 
erally true, in that no cash had changed hands, what the attor- 
ney had failed to disclose was that he had had the criminal de- 
fendant deed to him a lot valued at $4,000-$5,000 and also give 
a promissory note for $5,000 with the defendant's parents co- 
signing the note as sureties.lsg The state supreme court found 
that the attorney was guilty of a serious breach of professional 
ethics, and that he had willfully violated Canon 1 and Disci- 
plinary Rule 1-102(A)(4) and (5) by his misrepresentation of his 
fee arrangement to  the court.140 There can be little argument 
that the attorney in this case had used an overly literal Eng- 
lish usage to commit "dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresen- 
tation."l4l Moreover, in this situation, the critical information 
was largely within the control of the interested parties, and the 
court had little independent mechanism for ascertaining the 
falseness of the attorney's statements. This is unlike an ALJ 
with broad discovery powers. 
In re Turner142 involved a complex receivership matter 
with two corporate entities and a private attorney who acted as 
an independent counsel for one of those entities. During a re- 
cess in the receivership proceeding, the attorney accepted from 
his employing corporation a check issued to that corporation 
from a debtor corporation. After the recess, the trial judge 
137. 333 N.W.2d 713 (S.D. 1983). 
138. Id. at 714. 
139. Id. at 713-14. 
140. Id. at 716. 
141. Id. (quoting Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(4)). Unquestionably, a social se- 
curity attorney who similarly misstated his fee arrangements to the Social Security 
Administration would properly be subject to disciplinary proceedings. In re Quaid, 
646 SoSd 343, 349 (La. 1994). 
142. 416 A.2d 894 (N.J. 1980). 
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placed the employing corporation in receivership. The attorney 
subsequently deposited the check into his personal bank ac- 
count even though he knew that the check was an asset of the 
corporation then in recei~ership.'~~ The New Jersey Supreme 
Court found that the attorney had a duty t o  advise the Court of 
this asset and, until being advised of the Court's disposition of 
the receivership application, to hold the money in trust? 
"Respondent's failure to  do so constituted violations of DR 1- 
102, as conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, and 
of DR 7-102(A)(3), by failing to disclose that which he was re- 
quired to reveal."'45 The attorney was publicly reprimanded 
and ordered t o  reimburse costs to  the court.'46 Again, this sit- 
uation involved outright concealment of facts which the court 
had no effective independent means of ascertaining at the time. 
Furthermore, this was another situation involving an expedited 
process where time was of the essence. 
There are several cases involving default judgments and 
the failure of the party seeking the default to inform the court 
of understandings with opposing parties. In In re Schiff,14' 
the attorney was found to  have engaged in numerous bad acts. 
Those which are most relevant to the duty to disclose involved 
the attorney's repeated taking of default judgments when he 
knew that opposing counsel had become involved in the case 
and there was no intention on the part of defendants to  default. 
In some of these cases the attorney had told opposing counsel it 
was not necessary to  appear in court because he would obtain a 
continuance or otherwise move the matter along, and then 
proceeded to take a default. In several of these instances, the 
attorney then failed to inform opposing counsel of the entry of 
the default.'" The court imposed a public reprimand and two 
years' probation.'" These matters were, in reality, only ex 
parte in the sense that, by the attorney's conduct, he made the 
court unaware that the matters were being contested. They 
were not true ex parte proceedings, but only appeared to  be so 
because of the attorney's ongoing pattern of deceit. 
143. Id. at 895. 
144. Id. 
145. Id. . 
146. Id. at 896. 
147. 542 S.W.2d 771 (Mo. 1976) (en banc). 
148. Id. at 771-74. 
149. Id. at 775. 
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Similarly, in Hutton v. Fisher,15' a law firm took a de- 
fault judgment in a personal injury matter despite the fact that 
a senior attorney in the firm was aware that the defendants 
were represented by counsel who asserted that he had tele- 
phoned the attorney requesting additional time to answer and 
was assured that he might have whatever time he wanted. The 
case is complicated by the fact that the new associate who took 
the default judgment was apparently not made aware of the 
contact from the counsel for the defendants. There was also 
another unintentional error in counsel's averment in support of 
the default in that he asserted that no defendant was an infant 
although in fact one of the defendants was a minor.lsl With- 
out finding a violation of disciplinary rules, the Third Circuit 
ordered the default judgment vacated under these circumstanc- 
es. Again, this proceeding was ex parte only in a technical 
sense as the senior attorney was aware of the intention of de- 
fendants to retain counsel t o  represent them in the proceed- 
ing. 152 
In Singer Company v. Greever & Walsh Wholesale Tex- 
tile,ls3 the District Court set aside a default judgment where 
there had been a written agreement between counsel for an 
enlargement of time to answer, and plaintiff's counsel took the 
default judgment while being aware that counsel for the defen- 
dant would be out of town at the time. Again, there was no 
finding of a violation of disciplinary rules in the opening of the 
default judgment. 
In Dalminter, Inc. u. Edwards, I ~ c . , ' ~ ~  the court set aside 
another default judgment. In this interesting case, a corporate 
defendant, through its president, sent a letter to the attorney 
for the plaintiff in response to  a summons indicating that, "Our 
answer to  this complaint is that the Summons was served in 
error since our Corporation was not chartered until [several 
months after the incidents complained of]."ls5 The defendant 
corporation took no further action. When plaintiffs counsel 
fded for a default judgment, he did not inform the court of this 
letter which had not been filed with the court. The court found 
150. 359 F.2d 913 (3d Cir. 1966). 
151. Id. at 914-15. 
152. Id. at 915. 
153. 82 F.R.D. 1 (E.D. Tenn. 1977). 
154. 27 F.R.D. 491 (S.D. Tex. 1961). 
155. Id. at 492 (quoting a letter from the attorney for the plaintiff). 
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that plaintiffs counsel had a duty to  inform the court of the 
letter, particularly since a layperson might well have concluded 
from the summons that a response directly to the plaintiff was 
all that was required.156 The court did not find any violation 
of rules of conduct. 
The case of Litton Systems v. American Telephone & Tele- 
graph,15' involved discovery abuse in an anti-trust case. The 
federal district judge upheld the Magistrate's finding that 
plaintws counsel had engaged in a "pattern of intentional 
concealment of evidence"ls8 related to part of the underlying 
litigation. The attorney, without having reviewed all of the 
deponent's files, had stated in connection with the taking of a 
deposition that there were no other relevant documents of the 
deponent. In fact, there were other documents in the 
deponent's bottom drawer.lsg The attorney also misstated the 
scope of an investigation by a new president of plaintiffs com- 
pany* 
The Court of Appeals upheld the imposition of sanctions of 
over $10,000,000 against the plaintiff, although the sanctions 
were not as great as those sought by the opposing party, agree- 
ing with the trial court's finding that plaintiff s in-house coun- 
sel was "grossly negligent."160 Thus, this case involved not a 
mere failure t o  produce adverse evidence, but also an f i rma-  
tive denial of the existence of such evidence. 
In People v. Lewis,'" a criminal defendant raised several 
issues on appeal. Among those issues was his assertion that he 
had been denied effective assistance of counsel at trial in that 
his attorney had told the court that he was of the opinion that 
the defendant was able to  cooperate in his own defense and 
was fit for trial and sentencing. The defendant had wanted his 
attorney to assert that he was not capable of standing trial. 
The appellate court held, 
Where a defense attorney knows that his client is capable of 
communicating intelligently, and the client, in an apparent 
attempt to deceive the trier of fact, presents confused or self- 
contradictory testimony, it is the ethical responsibility of 
156. Id. at 493. 
157. 90 F.R.D. 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
158. Id. at 413. 
159. Id. 
160. Litton Sys. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 700 F.2d 785, 826 (2d Cir. 1983). 
161. 393 N.E.2d 1380 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979). 
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defense counsel to disclose to the trial court the facts as he 
knows them. See Illinois Code of Professional Responsibility, 
DR 7-102A(6) and (7); DR 7-102B(l).'~~ 
This case seems to be more directed to a duty not to  pursue a 
fraudulent claim than a duty to  introduce adverse evi- 
dence? 
The case of Hennigan v. Harris County1@ also involved 
matters of fraud. In this case, a constable brought a fraud 
action against an attorney. The attorney had presented a writ 
of execution to the constable with instructions to levy against a 
property owned by an individual who had been under a duty to 
pay the attorney fees arising out of a prior divorce action. 
There was a hearing held on the matter, after which the party 
owing the debt to the attorney paid the attorney by check in 
the amount of most of the debt, marked "'Paid in 
The attorney deposited that check into his bank account. He 
failed to  inform the court of the payment, and subsequently the 
court entered judgment against the constable. That judgment 
became final, and the constable paid the attorney the full 
amount of the debt. Approximately a year later, the constable 
learned for the first time that the debt had already been paid 
by the other party. The constable brought an action of fraud 
against the attorney for concealing the fact that he had re- 
ceived payment from the opposing party. The court found that 
the action of fraud was valid. 'Where there is a duty to speak, 
silence may be as misleading as a positive misrepresentation of 
existing fa~ ts . " '~  The court entered judgment against the at- 
torney based upon his fraud. Clearly this case involves wrong- 
ful self-dealing on the part of the attorney and actual fraud 
upon the court. 
In Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Chemtronics, Inc.,lB7 the 
court invalidated a patent on two grounds, the second of which 
is pertinent here. When the patent holder filed its application 
with the Patent Office, it failed to  disclose information in its 
162. Id. at 1384. 
163. This case is startlingly similar to the subsequent Supreme Court decision 
in Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986), in which the Court found no denial of 
the right to assistance of counsel where the criminal defense attorney refused to 
cooperate with the defendant in presenting perjured testimony. 
164. 593 S.W.2d 380 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979). 
165. Id. at 382. 
166. Id. at 384. 
167. 428 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1970). 
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possession regarding a prior unpatented device which had been 
disclosed to the public by a published article and a public 
speech, which device the court found to be substantially identi- 
cal to the device which was then patented. The court cited 
Supreme Court precedent: 
Those who have applications pending with the Patent Office 
or who are parties to  Patent Office proceedings have an un- 
compromising duty to report to i t  all facts concerning possible 
fraud or inequitableness underlying the applications in is- 
sue. . . . Public interest demands that all facts relevant to 
such matters be submitted formally or informally to the Pat- 
ent Office, which can then pass upon the sufficiency of the 
evidence. Only in this way can that agency act to safeguard 
the public in the first instance against fraudulent patent 
mon~polies. '~ 
It is noteworthy that this case, like other Patent Office cases 
cited in support of a duty to propound adverse inf~rmation,'~~ 
relies upon the specific nature of the Patent Office and its lim- 
ited resources. Beckman also repeated the rationale of the Su- 
preme Court in Pfizer & Co. v. Federal Trade Commis~ion:'~~ 
"The Patent Office, not having testing facilities of its own, must 
rely upon information furnished by applicants and their attor- 
neys."17' The Beckman court further elaborated: 
The Patent Office does not have full research facilities of its 
own, and it has never been intended by Congress that it 
should. In examining patents, the Office relies heavily upon 
the prior art  references that are cited to it by applicants. It  is 
therefore evident that our patent system could not function 
168. Id. at  565 (quoting Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Mainte- 
nance Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 818 (1945) (emphasis added)). The Patent Office 
has promulgated a regulation setting forth this duty. 37 C.F.R. 6 1.56 (1994); see 
also 37 C.F.R. 5 10.85 (1994). 
169. Another patents case cited in the commentaries is Kingsland v. Dorsey, 
338 U.S. 318 (1949). See Harold L. Marquis, An Appraisal of Attorneys' Responsibil- 
ity Before Administrative Agencies, 26 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 285, 298 (1976). In 
Kingsland, the Court upheld the disbarment of an  attorney from patent practice. 
The per curium opinion for the Court provides no details, but a strong dissent by 
Justice Jackson indicates that the attorney had participated in ghost-writing a 
trade journal article which was later presented to the Patent Office as having been 
written by an apparently disinterested labor leader. There was no claim that the 
article itself was false or misleading in any way. 
170. 401 F.2d 574 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 920 (1969). 
171. Beckman, 428 F.2d a t  565 (quoting Pj'izer, 401 F.2d a t  579.). 
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successftlly if applicants were allowed to approach the Patent 
Office as an arm's length adversary? 
To the extent that the Social Security Administration and its 
contracting state agencies have significant personnel and the 
ability, indeed duty, to obtain information with regard to 
applicants' claims for disability, and to the extent that OHAs 
have staff as well as the ability to bring in vocational and med- 
ical experts, the position of the Social Security Administration 
appears to be markedly different from that of the Patent Office. 
Whether SSA's ability to investigate claims should lead to  a 
different result in a social security case than in the patent case, 
should a claim ever rise to the level of court, remains at this 
point an open question. 
VI. A TENTATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE DUTY TO PRODUCE UNDER 
THE MODEL RULES 
Against the confusion of the various bar opinions and the 
silence of the courts on the subject, any conclusion on the basic 
issue presented, as t o  the duty under the Model Rules to  pro- 
duce adverse evidence in a social security hearing, is necessari- 
ly tentative. Application of Rule 3.3(d) in those jurisdictions 
which have adopted the Rules is dependent upon whether a 
social security hearing is an ex parte proceeding within the 
meaning of the Rules. While social security hearings have fea- 
tures that are similar to a classic ex parte proceeding, they 
have other features that are markedly dissimilar. Although it 
appears that the drafters of the Model Rules never specifically 
contemplated social security hearings, or were silent if they 
did, that does not answer the question. It is certainly not rea- 
sonable to expect that the drafters would specifically contem- 
plate, much less name, every type of judicial and administra- 
tive proceeding in which attorneys represent clients. 
I am forced to conclude that, despite the fact that social 
security hearings involve an enormous administrative agency 
with not only the duty but also the vast resources to  investi- 
gate social security claims, and the fact that ALJs in many 
ways do represent the government's interest, nevertheless, it 
appears that social security cases are sufficiently akin to  patent 
cases that the ex parte rule should apply to them. The hearings 
172. Id. at 564-65. 
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are, in a technical sense, nonadversarial. While ALJs have a 
duty to develop the record, they do not take the place of gov- 
ernment attorneys. More importantly, they should not take the 
place of government attorneys. They do not interview claimants 
prior to a hearing, although an interview of sorts is conducted 
by an SSA worker when the claimant initially applies. Those 
attorneys who take the position that they are not under the ob- 
ligations of Rule 3.3(d) in effect invite, practically compel, the 
ALJ to assume an adversarial position against their client. 
If Rule 3.3(d) does apply to social security proceedings, a 
number of questions still remain. The Rule requires a lawyer to 
"inform the tribunal of all material facts known to the lawyer 
which will enable the tribunal to make an informed decision, 
whether or not the facts are adverse."173 When is a fact 
known to a lawyer? Even if a fact is "known" to a lawyer, is the 
lawyer under a duty to investigate and obtain supporting docu- 
mentation of that fact, either as her own obligation or if or- 
dered to do so by an ALJ? Is the lawyer required to expend her 
client's money or her own money to investigate and obtain 
evidence which is potentially adverse to the client's case? Final- 
ly, what is a fact? 
The terminology section of the Model Rules states that, 
'"Knowingly,' 'known,' or 'knows9 denotes actual knowledge of 
the fact in question. A person's knowledge may be inferred 
from  circumstance^."^'^ Just  when a "fact" is "known" to an 
attorney is a troubling epistemological pr0b1em.l~~ Neverthe- 
less, knowledge of a related legal proceeding involving a client's 
medical condition could well demonstrate knowledge of the 
existence of medical reports ordinarily generated in that type of 
proceeding. 
Perhaps the most troubling area for the social security bar 
involves so-called "independent medical examinations" (IMEs) 
obtained by workers' compensation insurance carriers where 
the claimant for disability has previously litigated a claim for 
workers' compensation. It is a foregone conclusion that a con- 
tested workers' compensation case will always generate evi- 
dence adverse to the ~ 1 a i m a n t . l ~ ~  It  is not uncommon that a 
173. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(d) (1993). 
174. MODEL RULES, supra note 58, at 11. 
175. For a brief, but telling, exegesis of the subject, see Justice Stevens' con- 
currence in Nix v. Whiteside, 475 US .  157, 190-91 (1986). 
176. A similar situation would likely occur had there been a contested personal 
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claimant for benefits under Title I1 of the Social Security Act 
has previously asserted an  on-the-job injury in a workers' com- 
pensation case. In many instances, the same attorney who is 
representing the claimant in the social security claim, or anoth- 
er attorney in the same firm, has represented the claimant in  
the workers' compensation claim. In other cases the social 
security representative will be aware of a previous workers' 
compensation case. 
I t  is critical to an understanding of the depth of the bar's 
concern to realize that these medical examinations are only 
independent in the sense that the doctor is not the claimant's 
d0ct0r.l~~ The examinations are performed by physicians who 
are under contract to the workers' compensation insurance 
carriers and who understand full well the economic interests of 
the party who pays the bill."' If the IME is simply submitted 
to the Social Security ALJ, a highly adversarial report will 
become evidence in a nonadversarial proceeding, with the grave 
danger of impairing the truth-seeking function and skewing the 
results. If the claimant's case is before an ALJ who tends to 
seize upon any piece of adverse evidence to deny a claim, pro- 
duction of the IME will almost inevitably be fatal to the client's 
claim for disability benefits. As noted previously, when the 
claim is reviewed on the substantial evidence test, some courts 
will then uphold the denial of benefits even though the great 
weight of evidence supports the claim of disability.17g Indeed, 
this may well happen even if the workers' compensation referee 
or appellate tribunal discredited the IME and awarded 
workers' compen~ation.'~~ 
Rule 3.3(d) itself does not contain a duty to obtain material 
facts, only a duty to inform a tribunal of material facts. If the 
existence of a prior workers' compensation claim is a "fact," 
then it would appear that there is a duty to inform the ALJ of 
a prior workers' compensation proceeding. It does not necessar- 
injury action involving the claimant. 
177. See Thomas J. Vesper, Who's Muid of the Independent Medical Exam- 
iner?, TRIAL, Dec. 1993, at 29. 
178. Such doctors tend to be at least as adversarial as SSA's consulting phy- 
sicians of whom Justice Douglas said "[tlhe use by HEW of its stable of defense 
doctors without submitting them to cross-examination is the cutting of corners-a 
practice in which certainly the Government should not indulge." Richardson v. 
Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 414 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
179. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
180. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
132 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNrVERSITY LAW REWIEW [I995 
ily follow, however, that the ALJ then has a right to compel the 
attorney to obtain the adverse evidence against his client. Nev- 
ertheless, many ALJs seem to believe that they have such 
power.18' Thus, the attorney becomes compelled to work 
against her own client, often at her own expense. 
Interestingly, none of the various state court opinions on 
this subject have addressed the distinction between fact and 
opinion. Rule 3.3(d) is limited to a duty to disclose material 
facts, not opinions. Anyone who has ever dealt with forensic 
medicine will readily understand that the distinction between a 
medical fact and a medical opinion is an  elusive one at 
best.'" Moreover, it is quite common for medical reports and 
depositions to contain a mix of fact and opinion. For example, a 
single medical report could contain a "fact" that a blood test 
indicated a non-therapeutic level of anti-convulsive medication, 
coupled with the doctor's opinion that the patient was not regu- 
larly taking that medication. If there is a duty to produce facts, 
the attorney may be effectively compelled to produce adverse 
opinions that are part of the same document. 
VII. 1994 SOCIAL SECURITY ACT AMENDMENT ADDRESSING 
FRAUDULENT CLAIMS 
The Social Security Independence and Program Improve- 
ments Act of 1994 contains a section entitled "Expansion of the 
authority of the Social Security Administration to prevent, 
detect, and terminate fraudulent claims for OASDI and SSI 
 benefit^,"'^ which adds a new section 1129 to the Social Se- 
curity Act, effective October 1, 1994, reading, in pertinent part: 
C M L  MONETARY PENALTIES AND ASSESSMENTS FOR 
TITLES I1 AND XVI. 
(a)(l) Any person (including an organization, agency, or other 
entity) who makes, or causes to be made, a statement or rep- 
resentation of a material fact for use in determining any 
initial or continuing right to or the amount of- 
(A) monthly insurance benefits under title 11, or 
181. See supra text accompanying note 117. 
182. In a society that cannot agree on who is a living human being (Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)) and who is effectively a dead one (Cruzan v. Director, 
Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); In re TA.C.P., 609 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 
1992)), one might reasonably wonder whether there are any medical "fads" at all. 
183. The Social Security Independence and Program Improvements Act of 1994, 
Pub. L. No. 103-296, 3 206, 108 Stat. 1464, 1509-16 (1994). 
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(B) benefits or payments under title XVI, 
that the person knows or should know is false or misleading 
or knows or should know omits a material fact or makes such 
a statement with knowing disregard for the truth shall be 
subject to, in addition to any other penalties that may be 
prescribed by law, a civil money penalty of not more than 
$5,000 for each such statement or representation. Such per- 
son also shall be subject to an assessment, in lieu of damages 
sustained by the United States because of such statement or 
representation, of not more than twice the amount of benefits 
or payments paid as a result of such a statement or represen- 
tation. lB4 
The statutory definition of "a material fact" is curiously circu- 
lar: 
(2) For purposes of this section, a material fact is one which 
the Secretary may consider in evaluating whether an appli- 
cant is entitled to benefits under title I1 or eligible for bene- 
fits or payments under title XVI.lg5 
In this subsection, "one" clearly relates back to  "fact," thus 
maintaining the fact/opinion distinction. Query: is it a fact that 
an IME has expressed the opinion that someone is a malin- 
gerer? If it were, the distinction would be effectively eliminat- 
ed. 
While one may doubt that the authors of this amendment 
really considered the attorney's ethical dilemma caused by 
knowledge or possession of adverse evidence,lS6 it cannot be 
denied that the language is remarkably similar to Rule 3.3(d) 
of the Model Rules. Like Rule 3.3(d), moreover, it fails to re- 
solve the difficult issues of mixed fact and opinion evidence and 
the proper role (if any) of medical reports generated in a prior 
adversarial proceeding in adjudicating social security claims. It 
likewise fails to address an advocate's duty-if any-to obtain 
such evidence, or clearly delineate the scope of client confiden- 
tiality. 
Further, by adding the threat of civil penalties, without 
clarifying the ethical obligation of attorneys facing genuine 
184. Id. at 1510 (emphasis added). 
185. Id. 
186. The Report of the House-Senate Conference Committee on the Act is si- 
lent in this regard. Social Security Administrative Reform Act of 1994, [CCH Spe- 
cial ll Unemployment Ins. Rep. with Soc. Security (CCH) No. 7, Pt. 3, at 144-45 
(Aug. 22, 1994). 
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dilemmas, the new provision is especially troubling. Now the 
attorney is caught between risking a disciplinary complaint by 
her client on the one hand (as noted by the Virginia State Bar 
opinion letter)''' and facing severe financial sanctions on the 
other. This is all the more unfortunate since the section never 
specifically addresses the attorney's dual roles as advocate and 
"officer of the legal system."188 
VIII. THE APPROPRIATE ROLE OF THE ZEALOUS PRACTITIONER 
Notwithstanding all the legitimate concerns of the bar 
outlined above, I join those advocates who continue to  believe 
that in the long run it is not only consistent with the Rules of 
Conduct, but also with the best interests of clients, to produce 
all relevant evidence at a social security ALJ hearing.lp9 I as- 
sert that this position is not only prudent in terms of the 
attorney's good standing with the bar, but also as a litigation 
strategy. 
I am well aware of situations in which there is a complete 
breakdown of goodwill between certain advocates and the AUs 
before whom they appear, and this is most unfortunate. Never- 
theless, in the long run I believe that the clients will be better 
served by N1 disclosure for several reasons. First, if the attor- 
ney submits the adverse evidence, she can use that opportunity 
to  explain to  the ALJ why it should not defeat her client's 
claim. If the ALJ learns of this evidence fiom other sources, it 
will be too late t o  undo the harmful effect of the evidence.lgO 
Second, it should never be forgotten that ultimately, any ALJ is 
engaged in the job of judging. The ALJ necessarily judges not 
only the client but also the attorney. The great bulk of cases 
will inevitably involve some judgment calls. If the ALJ does not 
fully trust the attorney who practices before her, if the ALJ 
believes that the attorney may be hiding relevant, harmful evi- 
dence, it is most unlikely that the ALJ will exercise that judg- 
ment in favor of that attorney and that attorney's client. Third, 
if the ALJ believes that the attorney is hiding relevant evi- 
dence, this will almost inevitably provoke the ALJ to  adopt 
187. See supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
188. MODEL RULES, supra note 58, at 7. 
189. I am joined in this view by Charles Hall, Esq., a 
yprominent social security practitioner and author. CHARLES T. HALL, SOCIAL SECU- 
~ r n  DISABILITY PRACTICE 3 2.52 (West's Handbook Series, 1993 ed., 1993). 
190. Id. 
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more of the role of government advocate against the client 
rather than the appropriate role of fact finder. 
Based on many years of social security practice, I believe 
that  most ALJs are more likely to render favorable decisions 
when they have a complete record, when they feel they are 
being dealt with honestly, and when they know that the attor- 
ney who is presenting the claim is a zealous advocate who will 
make sure that the decision is correct by appealing that case as 
far as necessary if the decision is not legally supportable. 
Moreover, the social security regulations provide a practi- 
cal way to deal with the adverse medical report generated on 
behalf of an adversary in another legal proceeding. The zealous 
advocate can and should seek to have the ALJ subpoena the 
doctor who made the report to the social security hearing.lgl 
There is a growing body of authority that a claimant has a 
right to have the ALJ subpoena such a doctor to the hearing for 
purposes of cross-examination.lsZ If the ALJ refuses to issue 
the subpoena, or the doctor fails to comply, this would be a 
basis to exclude the adverse report or its use as substantial evi- 
dence.lg3 Indeed, the failure of claimant's counsel to exercise 
"his right to subpoena the reporting physician"1g4 was a key 
factor relied upon by the Supreme Court in Richardson v. 
per ale^'^^ to uphold the use of medical consultants' reports 
without cross-examination. 
THE NEED FOR RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT FOR 
ADMINISTRATIVE ADVOCACY 
As should by now be clear, the current state of the law on 
the professional responsibilities of the advocate in the realm of 
social security administrative proceedings is totally unsettled. 
As correctly noted by the Virginia State Bar Counsel, this plac- 
191. 20 C.F.R. $3 404.950(d), 416.1450(d); see also Richardson v. Perales, 402 
U.S. 389, 402, 404-05 (1971). 
192. See, e.g., Lidy v. Sullivan, 911 F.2d 1075 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 
U.S. 959 (1991); Wallace v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 187, 192-93 (3d Cir. 1988); Souch v. 
Califano, 599 F.2d 577, 580 (4th Cir. 1979); Goan v. Shalala, 853 F. Supp. 218 
(S.D.W. Va. 1994). 
193. See, e.g., Lidy v. Sullivan, 911 F.2d 1075 (5th Cir. 1990). Without the 
inducement of a fee similar to  those a doctor normally receives from the workers' 
compensation insurance carrier, it is doubtful that most doctors would comply with 
such a subpoena. 
194. Perales, 402 U.S. at 402. 
195. 402 U.S. 389 (1971). 
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es the attorney in a true dilemma.lg6 If she does not comply 
with an ALJ's direction to  produce adverse evidence, she runs 
the risk of both adverse action against her client and a disci- 
plinary proceeding and possible punishment for herself. If she 
complies with the ALJ's request or otherwise produces adverse 
evidence, she runs the risk of not only losing the case and the 
fee, but also having the client make a complaint to the disci- 
plinary authorities.'" Moreover, as has been seen, the few 
bars that are now addressing this issue are taking different ap- 
proaches, and individual ALJs and OHAs, apparently without 
rule-making authority, have taken it upon themselves to  issue 
their own, non-uniform edicts on the subject.'" The Social 
Security Administration has long emphasized its desire to have 
national standards,lgg and the current situation is the antith- 
esis of such standards. 
Almost twenty years ago, Professor Harold Marquis argued 
for the need to have a joint bar-agency committee draft a Code 
of Ethics covering the different types of administrative proceed- 
ings and perhaps supplemental rules tailored to the unique 
proceedings of the particular agencies.200 Clearly that need is 
at least as great today, and the 1994 fraud amendment to the 
Social Security Act may provide the necessary impetus. Indeed, 
SSA's September 1994 Plan for a New Disability Claim Process 
calls for the agency to  "establish a code of professional conduct 
for representatives in all matters before SSA."201 
Any such set of rules should also govern the responsibili- 
ties of individuals who are not members of the bar, but who 
practice before those agencies on anything other than an indi- 
vidual volunteer basis. There is some precedent for state courts 
196. See supra part IV.D. 
197. Id. 
198. See supra part IV. 
199. This is the stated justification for the Secretary's policy of nonacquies- 
cence. See Comment, The Doctrine of Nonacquiescence, 13 SAN FERN. V. L. REV. 9, 
16 (1985). 
200. Marquis, supra note 169, at 314. 
201. SOCIAL SECUFUTY ADMINISTRATION, PLAN FOR A NEW DISAB~FTY CLAIM 
PROCESS 42 (SSA Pub. No. 01-005, 1994). In February 1995, the Office of Hearings 
and Appeals proposed a set of "Rules of Conduct and Standards of Responsibility 
for Representatives." While the proposal was drafted, unfortunately, without any 
involvement of the practicing bar, SSA has at  least solicited comments on it. The 
proposal fails to address many of the W c u l t  issues raised herein with any speci- 
ficity. A revised dr&, made available in April 1995 and on file with the author, 
provides somewhat more specificity, but remains deficient in a number of respects 
in dealing with these difficult issues. 
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taking the view that they can regulate the conduct of non-attor- 
neys engaging in a quasi-legal practice.202 The Patent Oflice 
has dealt with the problem by promulgating a rule by which 
the Code of Professional Responsibility was made applicable to 
registered patent agents who are not attorneys.203 In the last 
several years, the Social Security Administration has seen a 
number of non-attorneys engaged in regular practice before 
Social Security ALJs. Clearly, if it is unethical for a licensed 
attorney to  fail to  produce certain evidence in an ALJ hearing, 
it cannot be ethical for a nonlicensed professional advocate to 
engage in similar conduct.2M Indeed, the Social Security Act 
gives the Secretary explicit power to prescribe rules and regula- 
tions for "agents or other persons" representing claimants and 
t o  suspend or prohibit from further practice "any such person, 
agent, or attorney who refuses to comply."205 
The obvious danger is that the Administration would be 
tempted to promulgate rules of a draconian nature intended to 
disadvantage claimants and their attorneys rather than honest- 
ly perform a truth-seeking function. For this reason, a joint 
bar-agency committee would be critical to  the process. In his 
memo to  the Charleston AU of April 1992, the United States 
Acting Chief Administrative Law Judge expressed his desire for 
"good relations between all Judges . . . and all members of the 
Bar t o  exist."206 He further opined that "we must build a con- 
sensus of opinion on this issue."207 
It will ultimately not serve the interests of the Administra- 
tion, the bar, or, most importantly, the claimants, for SSA to 
insist on the production of medical reports generated in ad- 
versarial proceedings, only to have advocates insist on the 
issuance of subpoenas which are unlikely to be honored. This 
will hardly enhance the administrative adjudicative process 
and its valid truth-seeking role. It would be more consistent 
with the benevolent purposes of the Social Security Act for the 
202. See M n  v. DiSalvo, 643 A.2d 118 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994). 
203. David J. Henry, Ethics in United States Patent Practice, 62 A.B.A. J .  465 
(1976). See generally 37 C.F.R. $ 10 (1994). 
204. I wish to make it clear that I would not seek to apply any such rules to 
the individual who, on a one-time, uncompensated basis, represents a friend or 
family member in a social security hearing. It is not reasonable to believe that 
such individuals would even be familiar with formal rules of conduct. 
205. 42 U.S.C. $ 406(a) (1988). 
206. U.S. ALJ Memorandum, supra note 10, at 4. 
207. Id. 
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Administration to recognize that requiring the production of 
such potentially highly prejudicial adversarial reports in what 
is ostensibly a nonadversarial adjudicative process is not par- 
ticularly useN ,  and is, ultimately, simply inappropriate. 
